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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20040142-CA
v.
ROBERT KELTON BERRY,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Stephen L. Roth presiding.
This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did trial counsel diminish the State's burden of proof by arguing that the

jury's decision was "as important, if not more important, than deciding who you are
going to marry or if you are going to buy a house"?

Standard of review. When a claim of ineffective assistance is raised for the first
time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review. Ambiguities or deficiencies
in the record will be construed in favor of finding that counsel performed
effectively. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 17,12 P.3d 92.
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by instructing the jury to base its

verdict only on "testimony and other evidence presented in court" and not on
gestures or facial expressions of courtroom spectators?
Standard of review. ''Trial courts have the discretion to determine whether a
curative instruction is required in a particular case." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,
925 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This case does not require interpreting any statutory or constitutional provision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 10 June 2003 with
one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), with a firearms enhancement pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004). R. 18-20. Following a mistrial, a redrawn jury found
defendant guilty as charged. R. 153,207-09. Defendant was sentenced to six years
to life and restitution. R. 228. He timely appealed. R. 231.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kneeling in a corner of a deserted and dimly lit industrial area, 19-year-old
Brandan Booth felt cold steel on the back of his head. R. 266:85,94-95,103-04. It felt
like a gun. R. 266:130. One of his assailants said, "If you move, you are dead/7 R.
266:131, see also R. 266:103,105. Brandan thought, "My life [is] over." R. 266:103.
Earlier that day, 12 March 2003, Brandan had been cleaning out his dad's
camper trailer. R. 266: 85. Afterwards he was going to his mom's place, walking
south on 3500 South towards a bus stop on 900 West in Salt Lake County. R. 266:8586; R. 267: 220. He was carrying his CD's, CD player, razor, toothbrush, and $15.
R. 266: 86-87. After waiting at the bus stop for awhile, he concluded that the buses
were no longer running and decided to walk. R. 266: 86. It was pretty cold and
getting dark; he was wearing a hoodie. Id.
As he walked along, a white Hyundai with Idaho plates made a "U" turn,
stopping beside him. R. 266:87-88,116. The passenger rolled down his window and
asked Brandan where he was going. R. 266: 87-88. Brandan thought (mistakenly)
that he recognized the driver from Job Corps or school or somewhere. R. 266: 87.
(Brandan later realized that he did not know him. R. 266: 89.) Brandan answered,
"To the bus stop on 35th." R. 266: 88. They offered him a ride, which he accepted.
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Id. The driver was defendant; the passenger was defendant's brother Karl. R. 266:
90-91; 118.
Brandan sat in the back seat.

Because the seat was folded down to

accommodate a bumper, he had to sit kind of "[c]runched up" on the folded seats.
R. 266: 89. One of the two men said, "We have to make a stop at the mall, and we
can drop you off there." Id. They seemed nice, although Brandan later reflected, "I
guess I should have been concerned at that point." R. 266: 90.
"My life is over"
At Valley Fair Mall, Karl returned a pair of pants at J.C. Penney, leaving
Brandan alone with defendant in the car. R. 266: 90-92. Defendant was friendly. R.
266: 107. He complained that he was "sick of giving [Karl] rides," acting "like a
chauffeur." R. 266: 91. By the time Karl returned, the buses had left the mall;
defendant and Karl offered to drive Brandan to Magna. R. 266: 92-93. Their first
stop was McDonald's. R. 266: 93. They asked Brandan if he wanted anything, and
when he declined they bought him an ice cream anyway. Id.
Defendant drove west from McDonald's, then turned down a street in an
industrial area. Id. When Brandan asked where they were going, they responded,
"We are going to a friend's. We have to stop at a friend's real quick." Id. They
drove to an industrial area, where Karl got out and vomited. Id. Brandan thought
he might have been drunk. R. 266: 94.
4

About three minutes later Karl got back into the car. Id. Defendant looked back
and said, "I think we need to adjust your seat/' Id. He then parked the car behind
some warehouses. Id. It was dark; the only light came from a dim light above the
door of a nearby loading dock. R. 266:95. No cars or people were around. Id. They
all got out of the car. Id. Defendant started adjusting the rear seat. R. 266: 96.
As Brandan was watching, Karl "came up and socked [him]" on the right cheek.
Id. It was a forceful blow. Id. Brandan started to put his fists up to defend himself,
but Karl pulled out a knife. R. 266: 97. It was about two inches long. Id. He held
it to Brandan's chest, then to his throat. R. 266:97-98. He said, "What do you have?
Give me all your stuff." R. 266: 98. Brandan thought, "My life is over." R. 266: 99.
Brandan gave Karl his CD player, his wallet, his bag containing his razor and
toothbrush, "everything [he] had." R. 266:99,127,148. His CD's were still in the car.
R. 266: 99. Karl looked through the wallet, removed the money, and threw the
wallet back at Brandan. Id. Brandan had about 200 CD's. R. 266:100. Karl wanted
to give them back to him, but defendant looked through them and said, "I am
keeping these." Id. They returned his toiletries kit, but kept the razor. R. 266:148.
They told Brandan to take his clothes off. R. 266:100. He started to remove his
sweater, but defendant stopped him and said something like, "We got to go." R.
266:132. One of the brothers, probably Karl, told him to " [g]o get in the corner" and
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kneel down. R. 266:101-02,129. Karl said to defendant, "Get the gun. Get the gun."
R. 266:101. Brandan saw defendant reaching under the car seat, apparently for the
gun. R. 266: 99,104. Brandan "thought for sure [his] life was over." R. 266:103.
On his knees, in the corner, Brandan felt cold steel on the back of his head. R.
266:103-04. It felt like a gun; he assumed it was a gun. R. 266:130. One of them
said, "If you move, you are dead." R. 266:131, see also R. 266:103,105. Then they
drove off, throwing a dollar bill out of the car window for the bus. R. 266:105-06,
128. Brandan got up and looked at the license plate of the car. R. 266:105. Brandan
started walking. He "was crying, couldn't breathe, was trying to find somebody."
R. 266:106. He "was in shock." R. 266: 111.
"I never seen nobody that scared before ever in my life"
Security guard John Maez saw him. R. 267: 168. Brandan was veering off,
swaying, staggering, "looking just lost." R. 267: 168-69. Maez thought he was
drunk. R. 267:168. When Brandan got closer, Maez could see he was hurt. R. 267:
169. The side of his face was bruised and bleeding, he was crying, and he was
having trouble breathing. Id, He was so afraid that he opened the door of Maez's
vehicle and "just jumped right in" and proceeded to tell Maez what had happened
to him. Id. The first thing out of his mouth was a request to "get him out of the
area." R. 267:170. He said, "They are going to kill me." Id. Maez offered to get him
medical help, but Brandan asked, "Can you please get me out of the area?" Id. He
6

kept saying, "Please, please, get me out of here. Get me out of here/7 R. 267:171.
Maez had "never seen nobody that scared before ever in my life/7 R. 267:172. Maez
called 911. Id.
When Officer Mike Christenson arrived, Brandan "was very upset, shaking,
crying, having a hard time talking and breathing." R. 267:190,194. He said he had
just been robbed. R. 267:194. He described the crime in detail. R. 267: 210-12. He
described his two assailants and said their car had a bumper in the back seat and
smelled like gasoline . R. 267: 199, 203-04, 208-09. An "attempt to locate" was
broadcast over police dispatch. R. 267: 206. The vehicle was described as a white
Hyundai with Idaho plates with two male occupants. R. 267: 234.
Officer Robert Cowan responded. R. 267: 206, 233. Officer Cowan drove to
Officer Christenson7s location and told him about a traffic stop he had made earlier
in the day. R. 267: 235. He had stopped a white Hyundai with Idaho license plates
for speeding. R. 267: 232. The car was occupied by a driver and a front seat
passenger. R. 267:233,235. Officer Cowan noticed a large bumper protruding from
the trunk into the back seat, where the seats were folded down. R. 267:234. He also
smelled a strong odor of gasoline. Id. Cowan requested Christenson to ask the
victim about the smell and the auto part in the back seat. R. 267: 235. Christenson
responded that the victim had told him the same thing. Id.
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Officer Frank Johnson also went to the location where Brandan was being
interviewed. R. 267:241-42. Brandan had by then calmed down and was talking to
the officers. R. 267:242. Officer Johnson got defendant's name and interviewed him
over the telephone. R. 267: 247, 263.
"I was actually being a good Samaritan"
In the telephone interview with Officer Johnson, defendant claimed that Karl
had robbed Brandan. R. 267:251. He stated that, after Brandan got in the car, Karl
sent him a telephone text message saying, "[P]ull over just right at the next light,
. . . I want to jack him." R. 267: 259.
When asked whether he had pointed something at Brandan's head to make him
think he had a gun, defendant replied, "No. I did not. I told the kid, I says, I didn't
want, I honestly didn't want my license plate [reported], and I told the kid, I says
just turn and face the wall, I says don't turn around." R. 267: 253. Defendant
admitted saying, "[W]hatever you do, do not turn around. My brother's like, you
know, and then that's when we drove away." R. 267: 253. He said that Karl "said
don't turn around or he was going to shoot him or something like that." R. 267:254.
Defendant denied that either of them had a gun, but he acknowledged that Karl
had put a knife to Brandan's throat. Id. "I had nothing to do with it," defendant
claimed. "I was totally against it." R. 267:256. In fact, he said, "I was actually being
a good Samaritan, giving someone a ride home." R. 267: 252.
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective when she argued

that the jury's decision was "as important, if not more important, than deciding who
you are going to marry or if you are going to buy a house." R. 267: 294.
Defendant's claim fails because it is premised on the Robertson test, which the
supreme court rejected in State v. Reyes and State v. Cruz. It also fails because
counsel complied with Robertson. She did not equate the jury's decision to making
major life decisions, but said it was more important because it was irrevocable.
Defendant also fails to demonstrate prejudice. There is no likelihood that, but
for counsel's argument, the jury would have believed defendant's claim that he was
"actually being a good Samaritan" over Brandan's compelling testimony.
2.

Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in responding to a

juror's claim to have seen a spectator prompting Brandan on the witness stand.
However, the court's response to the incident was textbook: it excluded the alleged
coaches, instructed the jury to base their verdict solely on the evidence, and
permitted defense counsel to cross-examine Brandan about the alleged prompting.
Defendant's request to query the other jurors about the alleged prompting was
pointless. The only possible effect of seeing the prompting was to bias a juror
against the prosecution, not against the defendant.

9

ARGUMENT
Introduction
Defendant's original brief argued three issues. Two were affected by the
supreme court's decision in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305, issued after
defendant's opening brief was filed.

This Court invited defendant to file a

supplemental brief "addressing the effect of State v. Reyes!' Order of 14 June 2005.
Defendant filed a supplemental brief addressing one sub-argument in defendant's
original brief.
Defendant's original point I centers on the principle of reasonable doubt.
Point LA argues that the reasonable doubt instruction violated due process by
failing to instruct the jury that the State must obviate all reasonable doubt. Br. Aplt.
at 19-23. This argument was rejected in Reyes, 2005 UT 33, \ 30 and State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, \ 21,530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 ("the Robertson test is no longer in force").
In defendant's supplemental brief, he does not mention this claim as having
survived Reyes. Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6. The State agrees that this claim did not survive
Reyes and accordingly will not address it.
Point LB contains two sub-points. The first sub-point argues that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Robertson objections. This sub-point rests
upon the claims asserted in Point LA In defendant's supplemental brief, he does not
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mention this claim as having survived Reyes. Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6. The State agrees
that this claim also did not survive Reyes and accordingly will not address it.
The second sub-point of defendant's original point LB argues that defense
counsel was ineffective for comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions in
closing argument. Br. Aplt. at 25. Defendant asserts that this claim is unaffected by
Reyes. Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6. Accordingly, the State will respond to this argument.
This will be the State's Point I.
Defendant's original point II argues that the trial judge erred by not instructing
the jury on the law at the close of the evidence. Br. Aplt. at 28. This argument was
rejected in Reyes, 2005 UT 33, If 49 and Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 27. In defendant's
supplemental brief, he does not mention this claim as having survived Reyes. Supp.
Br. Aplt. at 6. The State agrees that this claim did not survive Reyes and accordingly
will not address it.
Defendant's point III argues that the trial judge erroneously limited the jurors'
ability to determine credibility and failed to ensure that the jurors were impartial.
Br. Aplt. at 41. This claim is wholly unaffected by Reyes. Accordingly, the State will
respond to this argument. This will be the State's Point II.
In sum, point I of this brief will respond to the second sub-point of defendant's
original point LB, as expanded in defendant's supplemental brief. Point II of this
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brief will respond to defendant's original point III, found only in defendant's
original opening brief. This brief will not respond to point LA, the first sub-point
of point LB, or point II of defendant's original opening brief.
Defendant's supplemental brief is not explicit as to which claims or portions
of claims defendant continues to assert post-Reyes. To the extent the State has
misread defendant's intentions with respect to a particular claim, it requests leave
to file a supplemental brief.
I
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT DIMINISH THE STATE'S BURDEN
OF PROOF BY ARGUING THAT THE JURY'S DECISION WAS "AS
IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE IMPORTANT, THAN DECIDING
WHO YOU ARE GOING TO MARRY OR IF YOU ARE GOING TO
BUY A HOUSE"
Defendant claims that " defense counsel was ineffective for comparing a
reasonable doubt to major life decisions." Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6 (boldface and
capitalization omitted). He argues that trial counsel's closing ran afoul of the second
Robertson factor, which he contends survived Reyes. Id.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel faces a "difficult
burden." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1259 (Utah 1993). First, he must demonstrate
that his counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). Second, he must
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demonstrate that his counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, in that it
affected the outcome of the case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692.
When reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 685 (quoting Strickland 466 U.S. at 689).
"If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, [the court] will
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App.
1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id.
To satisfy the prejudice requirement, a defendant must show "that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice . . . that course should be followed." Id. at 697.
"Given the arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims rarely succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,354 (Utah App. 1993).
A, Reyes and Cruz overruled the entire Robertson test.
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails because its premise is false:
Robertson's second prong did not survive Reyes and Cruz.
13

Relying heavily upon Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375
(Utah 1989), Robertson adopted a three-part test for evaluating reasonable doubt
instructions:
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must
obviate all reasonable doubt/7 Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Second, the instruction should not state that a reasonable
doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more
weighty affairs of life/7 as such an instruction tends to trivialize the
decision of whether to convict. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, "it is
inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a
possibility/7 although it is permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.77 Id. at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1232 (Utah 1997).
Although Reyes and Cruz involved only the first and third prongs of this test,
in both cases the supreme court repudiated the entire test. Thus, in Cruz, the court
stated, "In State v. Reyes . . . the State also urged us to overrule Robertson. We
accepted that invitation, and pursuant to our opinion in Reyes, the Robertson test is
no longer in force/7 Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 21. In its place, the court adopted the test
articulated in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994): "Simply put, we need only ask
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of
reasonable d o u b t . . / ' Id.
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails because it is
premised on the second prong of an abandoned test.
14

B.

Defense counsel's closing argument did not diminish the State's
burden of proof.

Defendant does not contend that counsel's argument violated the Victor test.
However, even if the second prong of the Robertson test were still in effect, defendant
could not demonstrate his trial counsel was ineffective. Counsel did not equate
reasonable doubt to major life decisions, but argued that the decision to convict was
irrevocable and therefore "as important, if not more important/' than major life
decisions. R. 267: 294 (emphasis added).
Robertson stated that a reasonable doubt instruction "should not state that a
reasonable doubt is one which 'would govern or control a person in the more
weighty affairs of life/ as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision of
whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). However, a jury instruction that "impress[es] upon the
jurors that the reasonable doubt standard requires greater proof than such decisions"
was proper even under the Robertson standard. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 356
(Utah 1993).
This is precisely what defense counsel did here.

In closing, she first

emphasized that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the highest standard of proof
known to our legal system:

15

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I told you in opening that I would talk
about beyond a reasonable doubt. And that's a very, very high standard
in our justice system. It is the highest standard of proof that there is.
And there are several standards of proof. One is by the preponderance of
the evidence. And that's in a civil case. And the jury can find for, say, like
a plaintiff, if they have shown by the preponderance of the evidence
whatever they are trying to prove.
A higher standard is clear and convincing evidence. That's even a
higher standard.
And, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the State has proven this
case by a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the State has
proven its case by clear and convincing evidence, your verdict must be not
guilty, because that is not high enough. Beyond a reasonable doubt is
higher than that. If you think that he maybe committed an aggravated
robbery or a robbery, your verdict must be not guilty. If you think that he
probably committed a robbery or an aggravated robbery, your verdict
must still be not guilty. That is how high the standard of proof is in this
case.
R. 267: 293-94 (addendum A). After impressing upon the jury the difficulty of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, counsel stated that the decision before
them was as important, if not more important, than deciding who to marry or what
house to buy:
And I have talked about how serious these offenses are, and how
important this decision is that you are making today. It is as important, if
not more important, than deciding who you are going to marry or if you
are going to buy a house. That's how careful you have to be and what
factors you would weigh in saying, "Am I going to marry this person?"
And the thing is, in a case like that, with buying a house or marrying
somebody, you can change that decision. You can get a divorce. You can
sell your house. But in this case you cannot.
R. 267: 294 (emphasis added) (addendum A).
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Far from equating the decision to convict with the decision to marry or buy a
house, defense counsel explained that because they could not later undo an error,
they must be more certain of their verdict than they would be when deciding to
marry or buy a house. Whether consciously or not, counsel was paraphrasing a line
from Justice Stewart's Tillman dissent: "Human error in making 'weighty and
important7 decisions in the conduct of one's personal life is common, as shown, for
example, by the high divorce rate and large numbers of bankruptcies. Of course,
many of those decisions can be corrected, unlike the irreversible decision to
execute." Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 230 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In sum, counsel stressed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "a very, very
high standard/7 in fact "the highest standard of proof that there is." R. 267:293. She
stressed that the jurors had better be sure about their verdict, because they could not
change it later. R. 267:294. She thus "impressed upon the jurors that the reasonable
doubt standard requires greater proof than such decisions," a proper statement of the
law even under the Robertson standard. Young, 853 P.2d at 356. Her argument was
thus entirely reasonable.
Moreover, even if counsel's performance were deficient, defendant has failed
to demonstrate "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Defendant's prejudice argument rests on supposed inconsistencies in Brandan's
testimony concerning who took his CD's. Defendant cites six times to the transcript
of the preliminary hearing and once to the transcript of the first trial, which ended
in a mistrial. See Supp. Br. Aplt. at 12. Of course, these transcripts were not before
the jury at trial, and so had no effect on the verdict. They are therefore not relevant
to the question of prejudice or any other question on appeal. However, even the
passages from those irrelevant transcripts, read together with the relevant trial
transcript, demonstrate that Brandan consistently maintained that, however Karl
and defendant obtained possession of his CD's, it was defendant who refused to
return them. Id, at 11-13; R. 266: 99-100,135. For example, when asked on crossexamination whether it was not defendant who said, "Give the CD's back," Brandan
stood firm: "No, it wasn't. He was the one who took them." R. 266:135. In other
words, like his younger brother Karl, defendant was an active participant in this
crime.
Moreover, defendant's own story —adduced at trial by the prosecutionconfirmed his guilt. He admitted driving Brandan to a secluded location after
receiving Karl's text message, "[P]ull over just right at the next light,... I want to
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jack him." R. 267:259. Thus, even if it was Karl who brandished the knife, touched
the back of Brandan's head with a gun (or a facsimile, its legal equivalent), and took
physical possession of the CD's, defendant was equally guilty of the crime. "Every
person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense . . .
who... intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct/7 Utah Code Ann. § 762-202 (West 2004). The jury was instructed on this principle. See R. 195.
But regardless of such subtleties, this case was not close. Brandan had no
motive to falsely implicate defendant; defendant had every motive to falsely shift
blame to Karl. Brandan gave a detailed, consistent account, tested under crossexamination.

Defendant's telephone statement to police confirmed most of

Brandan's account. It differed only in that defendant claimed that his brother Karl
was the criminal, whereas he was "actually being a good Samaritan/7 R. 267: 252.
The jury was out less than an hour. See R. 267: 302.
On these facts, there is no likelihood that the jury convicted defendant because
defense counsel argued that their decision was "as important, if not more
important" than the decision to marry or buy a house.

19

II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO BASE ITS VERDICT ONLY ON
"TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN COURT"
Defendant claims that the trial court deprived him of "a fair trial when he
misinformed the jurors not to consider Brandan's mother's coaching for any
purpose, including determining Brandan's credibility/7 Br. Aplt. at 41. He also
contends that "[t]he trial judge further abused his discretion in failing to grant
defense counsel's request to interview all the jurors for possible bias/7 Br. Aplt. at
47.
Proceedings below. At one point during Brandan's cross-examination, juror
Ryan interrupted the proceedings and asked to speak to the court. R. 266: 136
(addendum B, which includes R. 266:136-45). The court cleared the courtroom, then
directed the juror to make a written statement and give it to the bailiff. Id. The
statement read: "The lady in the audience is prompting the witness with head
shakes the last ten minutes/7 R. 266:137.
The judge said that he had not been watching the audience. Id. Defense
counsel stated, "I haven't noticed anything. And that's always my concern when we
get other people in the courtroom. I just wish the State would make me a decent
offer in this case, and we could end it." Id. The court ordered the victim's mother
and the victim coordinator to return to the courtroom. Id. Both stated they had not
20

prompted Brandan on the stand, and the victim coordinator stated that she had not
been observing the mother, but watching Brandan testify. R. 266:137-38.
The court then asked both women to leave. "I am not sure what happened
here. But I don't believe that you should be in the audience at this point, because an
issue has been raised." R. 266:138. The judge stated that he was "not making any
accusations at all. But I want to make sure this trial goes on with as little problem
as can be possible." Id.
Defense counsel then requested that the other jurors be questioned concerning
what they saw or did not see. Id. She asserted "a right to mention what happened
in the courtroom, and it appeared that someone was prompting Brandan." R. 266:
139. The court ordered that defense counsel could not comment on anything the
juror said. Id. Defense counsel then expressed a preference "to ask them if they
noticed anything. They may not. And then just do a general instruction that they
are not to take that into consideration. And I think that would cure it." R. 266:140.
The court was "not inclined to further emphasize the process by going through and
talking to individual jurors, especially when I believe that the issue can be cured
with an instruction." R. 266:141.
Defense counsel suggested a wording change in the court's draft instruction,
which the court adopted. R. 266:142. She then complained that "you are telling the
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juror to disregard what he saw, and he can't give any weight to what she was
saying." Id. The court responded that counsel could cross-examine the witness
about it; counsel responded, "Okay. He will say no." Id. The court replied, "The
issue here really is both the effect of this alleged activity on the witness—we don't
know whether it happened or not— and on the juror. And I think that it can—that
you can deal with that issue in that way." Id.
Defense counsel responded, "Why don't we just forget the instruction, and that
will just be my question." R. 266:143. Over the prosecutor's objection, the court
decided not to give the instruction "at this point." Id. But it expressed an intent to
instruct the jury that they "are to accept as evidence and rely on in their
deliberations only testimony or other evidence presented in court. They may not
consider gestures, facial expressions, or other demonstrations by anyone else
present in the courtroom." R. 266:144. Defense counsel then expressed a concern
that "this juror should be able to consider that. I don't think he should be instructed
to disregard what he saw as prompting." Id. The court ruled, "I will allow you to
cross examine the witness, subject to objection, about whether he was prompted by
anybody in the courtroom

I don't think he can rely on anything she did there.

She is not a witness ..." Id.
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The trial proceeded with the victim's mother and the victim coordinator outside
the courtroom. See R. 266:145. The judge instructed the jury that "[j]urors are to
accept as evidence and rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other
evidence presented and accepted in court. They may not consider gestures, facial
expressions, or any other demonstrations by any other person present in the
courtroom/' R. 266:145-46. Defense counsel then resumed her cross-examination
of Brandan Booth:
Q Brandan, before we just took a break, there were two other
people in the courtroom; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And now they are not here anymore?

A

No.

Q When I was asking you questions about this case, did you see
anybody make gestures towards you?
A

No.

Q You didn't see anybody prompting you to say a certain answer
in a certain way?
A

What's prompting? Telling me to say something?

Q

Yes.

A

No.

Q

Anybody nodding?
23

A

No.

Q

Trying to alter your testimony?

A

I was looking at you.

R. 266:146.
Standard of review. "Trial courts have the discretion to determine whether a
curative instruction is required in a particular case." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,
925 (Utah App. 1990).
Precedent. "It is axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial
trial based on the evidence presented to the jury, without the jury being influenced
by information from outside sources." State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1263 (Utah
1983). Consequently, a jury's verdict must be "based on the evidence and the law
presented to it." State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81,85 (Utah 1988) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Verdicts decided on some other basis make the constitutionally guaranteed right
to trial by jury a nullity." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that a jury's verdict must
"be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources." Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966). Indeed, a conviction may be set aside where
jurors are exposed to "information that was not admitted at trial." Id. (citing
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959)).

24

In State v. Pearson, 943 R2d 1347 (Utah 1997), our supreme court held that the
prosecutor's remarks in closing were improper because they "called the jury's
attention to facts outside the evidence." Id. at 1352. Nevertheless, the action did not
prejudice the outcome of the case because the court had instructed the jurors that the
arguments of counsel were not evidence and that "they were to rely only on the
evidence in reaching factual conclusions." Id. at 1353.
Prompting presents a special case. "When the trial court's attention is drawn
to the fact that a witness is being coached by a spectator at the trial, the trial court
has a duty to take curative action." State v. Rodriquez, 509 N.W.2d 1,3-4 (Neb. 1993).
"Ordinarily, permitting the issue to be raised on cross-examination will constitute
an effective cure." Id. at 4. Alternatively, "admonition to the coach may be
sufficient." Id. (citing Evers v. State, 121 N.W. 1005 (1909), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Brockman, 168 N.W.2d 367 (1969)); cf. Commonwealth v. Toon, 773 N.E.2d
993,1006-07 (Mass. App. 2002). Excluding the purported coach and instructing the
jury not to let the court's admonition and exclusion of the spectator "affect the
credibility of the witness in this case" will also suffice. United States v. Tolliver, 61
F.3d 1189,1208 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds by Sterling v. United States, 516
U.S. 1105 (1996). Where a spectator may have engaged in disruptive behavior, the
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trial court may appropriately instruct the jurors to be "governed solely by the
evidence." State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 935 (Utah App. 1991).
Defendant cites no case, and the States is aware of none, holding that the
appropriate response to a coaching incident is to instruct the jury that they may
consider facts not admitted into evidence.
People v. Smith, 624 N.E.2d 836 (111. App. 1993), bears sufficient similarity to the
case at bar to be instructive. Smith appealed her conviction for arson of the Kopy
Kat Restaurant. Id. at 838. Aimee Manis, a waitress at the Kopy Kat, was a witness
for the prosecution. Id. at 844. An alternate juror reported to the bailiff that the
witness's mother had on several occasions mouthed the words "I don't know" while
her daughter was testifying. Id.
The judge interviewed the juror with counsel present in the jury room. The
juror stated that she had mentioned the incident to other jurors, whom the judge
also interviewed. None of the others had observed anything. Id. The judge
interviewed the witness, who denied that her testimony was being directed by her
mother. The witness's mother also denied trying to communicate with her. Id. The
judge denied the defendant's mistrial motion but ordered the mother to leave the
courtroom during her daughter's testimony. Id.
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After surveying several precedents, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the
trial court's handling of the alleged coaching incident was reasonable and "well
within its discretion." Id. at 845. The court noted that this was not "an incident of
obvious coaching," as "only one alternate juror claims to have noticed the incident"
and the witness and her mother "both claimed they were not attempting to
communicate during testimony." Id. In fact, the court concluded," [t]he most logical
effect of this incident was to impeach Manis and weaken the State's case, as Manis
was a prosecution witness." Id.
Analysis, Smith provides a useful guide here. The incidents were similar: as
in Smith, the instant case involves a juror who claimed to have seen a coaching
incident and a witness and a mother who denied it. In Smith, the only curative
action taken by the court was to exclude the purported coach. Here, the court
excluded the purported coaches and invited defendant to cross-examine the witness
about the purported coaching. This latter action alone, according to Rodriquez, 509
N.W.2d at 4 , will "[o]rdinarily, constitute an effective cure." In addition, as
approved in Tolliver, 61 F.3d at 1208, the trial court gave a curative instruction. The
court, however, was "not inclined to further emphasize the process by going
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through and talking to individual jurors, especially when I believe that the issue can
be cured with an instruction/7 R. 266:141.1
Defendant compares the court's curative instruction to the judge's improper
comment in Rodriguez. See Br. Aplt. at 46. The comparison is inapt.
In Rodgriguez, the trial court "allowed the defense to make a factual issue of the
matter, permitting five defense witnesses to testify before the jury that they had seen
[a detective] coaching [a prosecution witness] on the stand." Rodriguez, 509 N. W.2d
at 3. Nevertheless, the judge's own conduct "amounted] to testimony from the
bench." Id. at 4. "Speaking directly to these issues, the trial judge stated that he had
been watching [the detective] and that [the detective] had not coached [the
witness]." Id. "In relaying this information," the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled,
"the trial judge assumed the role of a witness." Id.
Nothing similar occurred here.

The trial court merely gave a legally

unassailable curative instruction to the jury: "Jurors are to accept as evidence and
rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other evidence presented and
accepted in court. They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, or any other
demonstration by any other person present in the courtroom." R. 266:145-46. The

1

Defendant does not challenge the trial court's sua sponte announcement that
it was "not going to make a juror a witness here. That's just not going to happen."
R. 266:139.
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court expressed no opinion as to whether coaching had occurred. If anything, the
exclusion of Brandan's mother and the victim coordinator from the courtroom,
coupled with defense counsel's cross-examination of Brandan concerning coaching,
left the impression that coaching may well have occurred. R. 266:146.
This was of course defendant's goal. As in Smith, "[t]he most logical effect of
this incident was to impeach [Brandan] and weaken the State's case, as [Brandan]
was a prosecution witness/' Smith, 624 N.E.2d at 845. Evidence that Brandan was
merely parroting the views of his mother, who knew nothing of the incident, could
only have eroded his credibility. Consequently, any "bias" resulting from this event
ran in defendant's favor. There is some potential for prejudice against a defendant
where jurors suspect that he is involved in prompting. See State v. Tueller, 2001 UT
App 317, Iffl 12-13,37 P.3d 1180 (finding no prejudice). But there is no potential for
prejudice against a defendant where jurors suspect that a prosecution witness is
involved in prompting.
Defendant's preferred solution of permitting the jury to consider matters not
admitted into evidence is the one obviously wrong choice. All cases agree that the
jury's verdict must be "based on evidence received in open court, not from outside
sources." Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351. He cites no contrary authority.
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Defendant's complaint that the court failed to interview other jurors rings
equally hollow. It is true enough that "the only way to determine if any other jurors
had seen the coaching and were biased by it was to question the jurors themselves."
Br. Aplt. at 47. But whether other jurors had seen the coaching was irrelevant. One
biased juror would have required a mistrial. Juror Ryan had or claimed to have
"seen the coaching," yet defendant did not move for a mistrial; he merely asked
whether the court was going to question "the other jurors," R. 266: 139. But
interviewing the other jurors "just to ask them if they noticed anything," which is
what defense counsel wanted, would have added nothing. R. 266:140. Defendant
does not explain how increasing the number of jurors known to have seen the
purported prompting would change anything.2
Finally, defendant argues that "improper contacts between jurors and
interested parties support the need for an evidentiary hearing." Br. Aplt. at 47
(citing State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277,281 (Utah 1985)).
There were no improper contacts here. Seeing a person across the room is not
an "improper contact." If it were, a juror seeing a defendant seated at counsel table
or a witness in the gallery would raise "a rebuttable presumption of prejudice."
2

From the defense perspective, one tactical objective for interviewing the
other jurors would have been to inform them of the coaching allegation, since that
information could only harm the State's case. Cross-examining Brandan achieved
this objective.
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State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35,18,116 P.3d 317 (quoting Pike, 712 P.2d at 280). "Contact"
in this context typically refers to a "conversation in the hall," or other "brief
conversation." Piker 712 P.2d at 280; Shipp, 2005 UT 35, \ 2. Any such conversation
that amounts to "more than a brief, incidental contact" risks "breeding a sense of
familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors ['] judgment as to credibility." Pike, 712
P.2d at 281. Merely viewing someone across the courtroom, like overhearing a
bailiff yell "they are guilty," is not "the type of contact which raises a presumption
of prejudice." State v. Hale, 2000 UT App 297, \ 1 (unpublished) (copy attached at
addendum C in compliance with Utah R. App.P. 30(f)).
In any event, defendant never claimed below that the juror's view of the alleged
coaching constituted a Pike contact, nor did he seek an evidentiary hearing or move
for a mistrial. See R. 266:136-45. On the contrary, defense counsel stated that "the
only concern is I think this juror should be able to consider that. I don't think he
should be instructed to disregard what he saw as prompting." R. 266:144. This
demonstrates that his tactical objective at trial was to maximize, not minimize, the
effect of this "contact."
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process/' Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals,
2005 UT 18, f 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 (Cal.
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _j__ October 2005.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

ERICVOROSJR.
sistant Attorney General
ief, Appeals Division
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JOAN C WATT
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424 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellant
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1 I what's going on.
2 J seat.

He wouldnrt have wasted his time to fix the

There would be no reason to do it.

3 I

Now, the State is trying to suggest that the —

the

4 I victim is trying to suggest that the victim was taken on a wild
5 I goose chase here. And that just is not true. Again, he was in
6

the car for a long period of time. And if you are going up to

7

Bangerter to go out to Magna, you can cut through there.

8

went to the McDonald's which is on 36th West.

9

there.

They

You go north

You run into the residential areas. And there are

10

several streets that head up to Bangerter.

11

they pulled over in that area was, number one, first, Karl had

12

to throw up, if you remember that.

13

He threw up.

14

the seat, because the guy was uncomfortable.

15

He says that his feet were scrunched up and it was very

16

uncomfortable.

17

over into some secluded area to rob him.

18

The only reason

He got sick and he got out.

Then they get back in.

Then they have to adjust
He mentions that.

And that is why they pulled over, not to pull

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I told you in opening that

19

I would talk about beyond a reasonable doubt. And that's a

20

very, very high standard in our justice system.

21

highest standard of proof that there is. And there are several

22

standards of proof.

23

evidence.

24

for, say, like a plaintiff, if they have shown by the

It is the

One is by the preponderance of the

And that's in a civil case. And the jury can find

25 I preponderance of the evidence whatever they are trying to

1

prove.

2
3

A higher standard is clear and convincing evidence.
That f s even a higher standard.

4

And, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the State

5

has proven this case by a preponderance of the evidence, or if

6

you find that the State has proven its case by clear and

7

convincing evidence, your verdict must be not guilty, because

8

that is not high enough.

9

than that.

Beyond a reasonable doubt is higher

If you think that he maybe committed an aggravated

10

robbery or a robbery, your verdict must be not guilty.

11

think that he probably committed a robbery or an aggravated

12

robbery, your verdict must still be not guilty.

13

high the standard of proof is in this case.

14

If you

That is how

And I have talked about how serious these offenses

15

are, and how important this decision is that you are making

16

today.

17

deciding who you are going to marry or if you are going to buy

18

a house.

19

you would weigh in saying, "Am I going to marry this person?"

20

And the thing is, in a case like that, with buying a house or

21

marrying somebody, you can change that decision.

22

divorce.

23

cannot.

24
25

It is as important, if not more important, than

That f s how careful you have to be and what factors

You can sell your house.

You can get a

But in this case you

And, ladies and gentlemen, I was going over the
transcript last night, and I just gave up counting how many

I ! m not sure.

I don ! t

1

times the victim said, "I don't know.

2

know.

3

He is not sure what happened, so how can you be sure?

4

they ask you to convict him?

5

beyond a reasonable doubt, and I ask for two not guilty

6

verdicts.

I'm not sure."

7

Thank you.

8

THE COURT:

9

Ms. Peters?

10

MS. PETERS:

That is not beyond a reasonable doubt.
How can

They have not proven their case

Thank you, Ms. Gustin-Furgis.

Thank you, your Honor.

The defendant

11

did the best he could.

So then he drove Brandan to safety.

12

was the driver.

13

message and then he said, "Don't do it."

14

next step would be to drive Brandan to safety, because he

15

didn't want it to happen, so he drove Brandan to a bus stop.

16

No, we didn't hear anything about that.

17

police station, so he wouldn't get jacked.

18

anything about that, either.

19

Instead, he drove Brandan to a secluded area.

20

and deliberate, look at the map.

21

on the map.

22

back there but warehouses.

23

Maez, who has been a security guard with USANA for six years,

24

that there is nothing over there except warehouses.

His brother wanted to jack him.

He

He got a text

So, of course, the

He drove Brandan to a
We didn't hear

Did he drive Brandan home?

No.

When you go back

See how many houses you see

See how many warehouses you see.

There is nothing

And you heard testimony from John

25 I think that that is a protective area.

I don't

I don't think the
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1

A

Yeah.

2

Q

That you said was from Robert Berry and his brother?

3

A

Yeah.

4

Q

Then do you remember showing them a cigarette butt?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And you said that's what Robert had smoked?

7

A

I am not sure who I said smoked it.

8

Q

But you may have said that to the cops?

9

A

I remember saying the cigarette, there was a

10

cigarette.

11

that.

I think I said one of them smoked or something like

12

Sorry.

13

THE COURT: Are you having a little trouble hearing?

14

JUROR:

15

(Mr. Ryan) No, I need to talk to you, Judge,

and the prosecutor.

Or I can tell the bailiff.

THE COURT: No, let!s hold on at this point.

16

Let!s

17

take a break, and we will have the jury taken out, and then you

18

can speak briefly to the bailiff. Why donft you write down

19

what you want me to know, and give it to the bailiff, and he

20

will bring it in to me. All right?

21

out.

22

you are writing.

Let's have the jury go

If you will do that without the other jurors seeing what

23

(A brief pause in the proceedings.)

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.

I am going to ask the other people

in the courtroom to leave for just a minute while we discuss

1

this issue.

2

prompting the witness with head shakes the last ten minutes."

3

I haven ! t been observing anybody in the audience, so I can ! t

4

confirm that.

5

audience and noticed anything?

6

The statement says, "The lady in the audience is

Has anybody else been watching anybody in the

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

I haven T t noticed anything.

7

that's always my concern when we get other people in the

8

courtroom.

9

in this case, and we could end it.

10

And

I just wish the State would make me a decent offer

THE COURT:

Well, at this point, please have the

11

victim coordinator and the mother come in.

12

juror has said is, "The lady in the audience is prompting the

13

witness with head shakes for the last ten minutes."

14

THE MOTHER:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE MOTHER:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS COORDINATOR:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE MOTHER:

21

THE COURT:

22

THE MOTHER:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS COORDINATOR:

25

Okay.

What the

I wasn't.
Pardon?
I wasn't.
Were you?
No, sir.

Were you observing —

who are you, ma'am?

I am his mother, Brandan's mother.
Were you observing her at all?
What?
I am talking to the witness coordinator.
No, I am sorry, I wasn't.

I was watching the victim, your Honor.

1

THE COURT:

2 1

MS. PETERS:

Ms. Peters?
I am not sure, because we weren T t

3

looking back there.

4

It is relevant that thatfs what the juror feels he saw.

5

am not sure what was happening behind me.

6

realize they had done it.

7 I
8

THE COURT:

They might not even

Were you consciously prompting the

THE MOTHER:

I don't —

I wasn f t there.

I don f t know

what happened or how it happened.

11
12

But I

witness?

9
10

I think that might not even be relevant.

THE COURT:
leave here.

I am going to ask at this point that you

I am not sure what happened here.

But I don ! t

13 I believe that you should be in the audience at this point,
14 I because an issue has been raised.

I am not making any

15

accusations at all.

16

with as little problem as can be possible.

17
18

But I want to make sure this trial goes on

So we will call the jury back in, and we will proceed
at this point.

19

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

20

that?

21

jurors saw or didn't see.

Your Honor, can we ask them about

Because that's a concern to me, as to what the other

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. PETERS:

What do you suggest?
Rather than talking to all of the

24

jurors, it didn't seem like all the jurors had a problem, if we

25

are so inclined to speak to the jury, maybe speak to that one

1

specific juror.

2

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

I think at this point, your

3

Honor, I have a right to mention what happened in the

4

courtroom, and it appeared that someone was prompting Brandan.

5

I think I have a right to say that in the courtroom.

6
7

THE COURT:
That's your position.

8
9

Well, I am not sure you do at this point.
I understand that that's your position.

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

Because it was his observation.

So I don't know if the rest of the jurors saw it or not.

10

think I have a right to comment on that.

11

what they are going to be talking about.

12

THE COURT:

But I

Because I don't know

I am not going to make a juror a witness

13

here.

14

on anything that a juror told us that he saw, at this point.

15

That's my ruling, and I know you take exception to it.

16

on the record.

17
18
19

That's just not going to happen.

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

So you can't comment

That's

Are we going to ask the other

jurors about anything?
THE COURT:

Well, that's a question.

It appears to

20

me that it is appropriate —

I am concerned about going further

21

into this than we have at this point.

22

indication from one of the jurors that he perceived something

23

which he understood as being prompting of a witness.

We have gotten an

Given

24 I that, one of the jurors perceived that, we don't know how many
25 ! others did, I think we have two options that I am willing to

1

consider at this point.

One is to talk to that juror and tell

2

him that he is not to consider anything done by any audience

3

member as being germane, in terms of testimony; and that the

4

jurors are to listen only to the testimony, and not take

5

inferences from any gesture or facial expression that an

6

attorney, party or audience member may make.
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

7

It would be my preference just to

8

ask them if they noticed anything.

9

just do a general instruction that they are not to take that

10

into consideration.

And I think that would cure it.

11

THE COURT: All right.

12

MR. NEILL:

13

the jurors.

They may not. And then

Your Honor, we would hate to ask all of

Obviously, none of us recognized or noticed it.

14

THE COURT: Well, obviously, you didn't.

15

MR. NEILL: And, I don't know, I have been paying

16

attention to the jury a bit.

17

the witness and the person asking the question.

18

it a bigger issue than it is with that potential —

19

single juror.
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

20

They seem to be going back from
I hate to make
with that

The problem is we don't know if

21

it is just a single juror issue, or if the rest of them noticed

22

it, too.

It is in their direct line of sight that they would

23

see her.

I am concerned about that, if the rest of them saw

24

that.

25

proceed with the jury instructions.

We can just ask them.

If they say no, then we will just

1

MR. NEILL:

Your Honor, if I could respond, we

2

believe it would pretty much taint the jury.

3

as he will be instructed, is to determine the credibility of a

4

witness.

5

credibility, that's his prerogative.

6

the other jurors —

7

witness and the weight of the evidence.

8
9

That juror has,

If he observed something which he thinks attacks that
But, as far as whether

I think it goes to the credibility of the

THE COURT: Mr. Neill, the concern I have is that we
have had one juror who says he has observed such a thing.

10

There certainly is the issue raised about whether other jurors

11

observed such a thing, as well.

12

have to give some kind of an instruction to the jury as a

13

whole, that they are to pay attention to the testimony, only;

14

and gestures or any indication of agreement or disagreement or

15

gestures from audience members, lawyers or anyone else is not

16

evidence.

It appears to me I am going to

It is not to be taken into consideration by them.

17

I am not inclined to further emphasize the process by

18

going through and talking to individual jurors, especially when

19

I believe that the issue can be cured with an instruction.

20

I think we can call the jury in here, I will give them an

21

instruction, and the instruction will be —

22

here, and I will write something out, and I will tell you what

23

it is going to be, so you will understand what it is going to

24

be.

25

So

give me a minute

(A brief pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT:

1

Okay, "Jurors are to accept as evidence

2

and rely on only testimony and other evidence presented in

3

court.

4

any other demonstration by lawyers, parties, or other persons

5

present in the courtroom."

They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, or

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

6

I would just ask that it be

7

"other persons present in the courtroom."

8

"lawyers" first, it sounds like the lawyers were making some

9

gestures.

10

THE COURT:

11

"parties" from that.

12

than the witness."

13

I think by putting

Okay, I will eliminate "lawyers" and
"Anyone present in the courtroom, other

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Well, but the only problem with

14

this, your Honor, is that you are telling the juror to

15

disregard what he saw, and he can't give any weight to what she

16

was saying.

17

THE COURT:

I am going to tell you what you can do on

18

this.

19

gestures from anybody in the courtroom.

20

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

21

THE COURT:

You can question the witness about whether he saw any

Okay.

He will say no.

It seems to me that is the fairest way to

22

deal with it.

23

alleged activity on the witness — we don't know whether it

24

happened or not —

25

can —

The issue here really is both the effect of this

and on the juror. And I think that it

that you can deal with that issue in that way.

1
2

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

Why don f t we just forget the

instruction, and that will just be my question.

3

THE COURT:

You can cross examine on that issue, and

4

it resolves, in my view, the problem of trying to shape an

5

instruction that would avoid the possible pitfalls.

6
7

MR. NEILL:
instruction, as well?

8
9

Your Honor, could we have the

THE COURT:

I am not going to give it at this point.

If we need to give it at the end of the evidence, then I will

10

do that.

11

anything —

12

at a party, and observe his reactions to things.

13

something that's normally done, and you don't tell them they

14

can't do.

15

objectionable.

16

probably is objectionable for a party to react to testimony.

17

If someone raises an objection, I would have to tell the party

18

not to react to the testimony, because in that way the party is

19

testifying through gestures or expressions without being under

20

oath and on the stand.

21

If you can tell me a way to do it, that can avoid
for example, I believe witnesses can certainly look
That's

Certainly, those kinds of things can be
I guess I will recover that.

The same thing for attorneys.

I think it

Attorneys can't make

I know people do this, and

22

gestures, can't make expressions.

23

it is the issue of when it becomes objectionable.

24 I audience will do that, as well.

People in an

It happens in trials.

In my

25 ! view, it is not appropriate for anyone to be doing that in a

1

courtroom.

2

So I am willing to do that.

It seems to me I can do

3

it without suggesting that they are not to —

that they are to

4

accept —

5

their deliberations only testimony or other evidence presented

6

in court.

7

or other demonstrations by anyone else present in the

8

courtroom.

the jurors are to accept as evidence and rely on in

They may not consider gestures, facial expressions,

Okay?

9

And then I will allow you

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS:

—

So you are going to give that?

I am going to give that.
Because the only concern is I
I don T t

12

think this juror should be able to consider that.

13

think he should be instructed to disregard what he saw as

14

prompting.

15

THE COURT:

Well, I agree with you to a certain

16

extent.

What I have stated, I believe to be the law.

He can't

17

rely on her saying anything for the truth of anything else.

18

What I am going to allow you to do is to cross examine this

19

witness in a —

20

subject to objection, about whether he was prompted by anybody

21

in the courtroom.

22

have raised about whether his testimony was affected.

23

think he can rely on anything she did there.

24

witness, at least not at this point, and certainly not under

25

these circumstances.

I will allow you to cross examine the witness,

And that seems to me to go to the issue you
I don't

She is not a

That's what I am going to do.

If there

1

are any other objections to this, other than what I have heard

2

at this point.

3

MR. NEILL:

No, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

Let's bring the jurors back in, then.

5

Before you bring the jury in, close the door just for one

6

second.

7

allegation.

8

believe, to make sure that there is no hint of any further

9

problem, that she should not be in the courtroom.

I didn't see what went on here.

I don't know what happened with her.

10

her a pointed question.

11

that.

13

But I

I have asked

I am not making accusations about

You understand what the process is here.
MS. PETERS:

12

We have had this

Should we ask both of them to remain

outside, and then just have Brandan come in?

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

15

(A brief pause in the proceedings.)

16

THE COURT:

17

(The jury returned to the courtroom.)

18

THE COURT:

We are ready to have the jury in.

Okay.

Thank you.

We are going to

19

proceed now with cross examination, where we left off.

20

give you an instruction in between here.

21

accept as evidence or rely on in their deliberations —

22

me.

23

rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other

24

evidence presented and accepted in court.

25

consider gestures, facial expressions, or any other

Let me start again.

Let me

The jurors are not to
excuse

Jurors are to accept as evidence and

They may not

1

demonstration by any other person present in the courtroom.
And we will now return to cross examination,

2
3
4

Ms. Gustin-Furgis.
Q

(By Ms. Gustin-Furgis) Brandan, before we just took a

5

break, there were two other people in the courtroom; is that

6

correct?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And now they are not here anymore?

9

A

No.

10

Q

When I was asking you questions about this case, did

11

you see anybody make gestures towards you?

12

A

No.

13

Q

You didn't see anybody prompting you to say a certain

14

answer in a certain way?

15

A

What's prompting?

16

Q

Yes.

17

A

No.

18

Q

Anybody nodding?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Trying to alter your testimony?

21

A

I was looking at you.

22

Q

All right, well, I will just return.

Telling me to say something?

You stated that

23

Karl walked you to the corner and knelt you down/ is that

24

correct?

25

A

Yeah.
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BILLINGS.
*1 Defendant appeals his convictions
aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnaping.

for

First, Defendant argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial because of juror
contact with court personnel. "[A] rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arises from any
unauthorized contact during a trial between
witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors
which goes beyond mere incidental, unintended,
and brief contact." State v. Pike, 111 P.2d 277, 280
(Utah 1985).
In this case, one member of the jury overheard a
bailiff in the courthouse yell "they are guilty." The
bailiff who made the comment was operating the
metal detectors at the court's entrance and was not

assigned to the jury. When questioned by the trial
court about the statement, the juror said that she
was not sure who had made the remark, believed it
was a joking comment, and did not understand it to
pertain to any particular case. Further, the juror
stated that it did not in any way interfere with her
ability to be fair and impartial and she did not
discuss it with any of the other jurors.
Given the "incidental, unintended, and brief nature
of the "contact," we do not think this is the type of
contact which raises a presumption of prejudice.
Certainly we cannot say that it had the "effect of
breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly
affect the juror's judgment as to credibility." Pike,
712 P.2d at 281. Furthermore, given the "incidental,
unintended, and brief nature of the contact, there is
no appearance of impropriety and thus no
deleterious effect upon the judicial process that
would violate Pike. We therefore conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress an eyewitness
identification. "The ultimate question to be
determined is whether, under the totality of
circumstances, the identification was reliable." State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). In
making this determination, the court must consider
the following factors:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of
attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3)
the witness's capacity to observe the event,
including his or her physical and mental acuity;
(4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter,
or whether it was the product of suggestion; and
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the
likelihood that the witness would perceive,
remember and relate it correctly.
Id. (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493
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Defendant challenges the reliability of the
identification under the first three factors, arguing
that fear rendered the witness's perception
unreliable and that his ability to see Defendant was
obstructed. A comparison of the facts found by the
trial court in this case with those upheld in Ramirez
leads us to a different conclusion.
*2 In Ramirez, the entire event occurred at night.
See id. at 783. The length of time the witness
viewed the defendant varied from seconds to a
minute or longer from a distance of between ten to
thirty feet. See id. at 782. The defendant wore a
mask. See id. The witness perceived the defendant
while the defendant threatened the witness with a
gun and while the defendant's accomplice hit and
threatened the witness with a pipe. See id.
In this case, the eyewitness, victim Mitchell Lewis,
had over two hours within which to view
Defendant's unmasked face at the park, riding in the
backseat of the car, and in the ravine in Big
Cottonwood Canyon. The eyewitness sat next to
Defendant in the ravine for an hour. Although
Defendant wore dark sunglasses, Lewis could see
his face behind them and noted Defendant's unusual
blinking pattern. The trial court found that although
Lewis was frightened, he was both "deliberate" and
"thoughtful" in his approach to the situation, as he
concentrated on observing and remembering
Defendant's
face and intentionally engaged
Defendant in conversation. Additionally, as we have
previously held, "we do not think the victim's
ordinary fear is sufficient to defeat this factor.
Otherwise, no victim of a violent crime could ever
meet this factor." State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 227
(Utah CtApp. 1998).
Defendant next argues that under the fourth factor
the identification was neither spontaneous nor
consistent. However, Lewis provided the police
with an accurate description of Defendant on the
day of the kidnaping and robbery. Thereafter, Lewis
consistently identified Defendant: at a photo array
ten days after the incident; at a lineup
approximately one month later; and finally at trial.

While Defendant argues that Lewis originally
omitted details of Defendant's description, the same
bears on his credibility and does not render the
identification inadmissible. See State v. Mincy, 838
P.2d 648, 658 (Utah Ct.App.1992).
Defendant further argues that under the fourth
factor Lewis' identification was the product of
impermissible suggestion. Defendant argues that
because an officer told Lewis he had picked the
right person out of the photo array, the subsequent
lineup, where Lewis once again identified
Defendant, was the product of impermissible
suggestion. Again, a comparison with the facts
upheld in Ramirez leads to a different conclusion.
In Ramirez, police informed the eyewitness they
had a suspect fitting the description he had provided
them. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The
identification took place on the street in the middle
of the night. See id. The eyewitness viewed the
defendant from the back seat of a police car while
the defendant, a dark-complexioned Apache Indian,
was the only suspect, had his hands cuffed to a
chain link fence behind his back, and had the
headlights of several police cars on him. See id.
Here, there was only a single comment made after
the photo identification which was negated by a
subsequent comment-that there was a possibility
that the subject would not be in the lineup-before
the lineup identification.
*3 We conclude that under the totality of
circumstances the eyewitness identification was
sufficiently reliable. We therefore affirm.
GREENWOOD, P.J., and JACKSON, Associate
P.J., concur.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244220 (Utah
App.), 2000 UT App 297
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